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ARE YOU SIRIUS? THE MISTAKE OF 
CONDITIONING APPROVAL OF THE     
SIRIUS-XM MERGER ON A PRICE CAP 
On July 25, 2008, in a 3–2 decision along party lines, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) voted to give the 
government’s final stamp of approval on the merger of Sirius Satellite 
Radio Inc. (Sirius) and XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. (XM) 
(collectively, the Applicants).1 The $3.3 billion dollar merger “was one of 
the most protracted in U.S. history,”2 not receiving approval until seventeen 
months after it was first proposed.3 The merger combined “the only entities 
authorized by the Commission to provide satellite radio service in the 
United States,”4 leaving just one satellite radio company, the newly merged 
Sirius XM Radio Inc.,5 to control the satellite radio frequencies and provide 
services to over 18 million listeners.6
In reviewing a merger of communication companies, the FCC must 
determine whether or not the merger “will serve the public interest, 
convenience and necessity.”
 
7 To determine whether the Sirius-XM merger 
was in the public interest, the FCC looked to define the relevant product 
and geographic markets but determined that there was insufficient evidence 
to do so.8 Thereafter, the FCC weighed the potential harms and benefits of 
the merger under a “worst case scenario” assumption.9 Although the 
Commission admitted that under such a scenario the merged entity would 
be a monopoly and have the “incentive and ability to raise the price of 
[satellite digital audio radio service (SDARS)],”10
                                                                                                                 
 1. Todd Shields, Sirius Satellite Radio Received Clearance from FCC to Buy XM, 
BLOOMBERG, July 26, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=aNVYmd3DlOfI. This followed the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) approval of the merger. 
See Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on its Decision to 
Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holding Inc.’s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio 
Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08_at_226.html [hereinafter DOJ 
Decision]. 
 2. David Hayes, Sirius – XM Merger’s Approval Opens a New Batch of Questions, KAN. 
CITY STAR, Aug. 17, 2008, at D1, available at 2008 WLNR 15499670. 
 3. Shields, supra note 1. 
 4. FCC, In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses XM Satellite 
Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, 22 F.C.C.R. 12,018, 
12,018 (June 27, 2007) [hereinafter FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking]. 
 5. See Google Finance, SIRI – Sirius XM Radio Inc., http://finance.google.com/finance?q= 
NASDAQ:SIRI (last visited Oct. 3, 2008). 
 6. Kim Hart, Satellite Radio Merger Approved, WASH. POST, July 26, 2008, available at 
2008 WLNR 13925502. 
 7. 47 C.F.R. § 25.119 (2004). 
 8. FCC, In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses XM Satellite 
Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, 25 (Aug. 5, 2008), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A1.doc [hereinafter FCC 
Decision]. 
 9. Id. at 25–26. 
 10. Id. at 28. 
 it determined that 
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numerous voluntary commitments made by the Applicants, including a 
voluntary price cap, “ameliorate[d] possible harm to consumers”11 and 
rendered the merger “in the public interest.”12
I. BACKGROUND TO THE FCC’S APPROVAL 
 
This note will argue that given the inadequacies of price caps as a 
regulatory tool and the high levels of uncertainty regarding the boundaries 
of the SDARS market, the FCC erred in approving the Sirius-XM merger 
on this basis. Part I of this note will provide a background to the FCC’s 
approval of the Sirius-XM merger, including information about the merging 
firms and the FCC’s regulatory policy. Part II will argue that the FCC erred 
in its reliance on the voluntary price cap because price caps are ineffective, 
anti-competitive, and in this situation, a hindrance in light of the uncertainty 
problem existing in the SDARS market. Part III will advocate that when 
evaluating the merits of mergers between firms in markets whose 
boundaries cannot be defined ex ante, regulatory agencies should approve 
such mergers on the condition that their decisions be revisited following ex 
post evaluation of the merger’s impact. Part IV will conclude this note with 
a summary of both the FCC’s missteps in approving the Sirius-XM merger 
and how such errors can be avoided in the future. 
A. THE APPLICANTS 
Before the merger, Sirius and XM were the sole FCC-licensed 
providers of satellite radio programming in the United States.13 At the time, 
XM’s subscriber base exceeded 9 million14 and its programming consisted 
of over 170 channels, including 69 devoted to commercial-free music and 
others devoted to broadcasts of Major League Baseball, the National 
Hockey League, ESPN, CNN and CNBC, to name a few.15 XM also 
provided services to automobiles through partnerships with automobile 
manufacturers, including deals with General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, 
Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, Suzuki, and Toyota.16 Sirius had a subscriber base 
of over 8.5 million.17 It offered the same number of commercial-free music 
stations as XM18
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 26. 
 13. See XM Radio – Fast Facts, http://xmradio.com/about/fast-facts/index.xmc (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2008). 
 14. Includes only domestic subscribers on the date that the FCC approved the merger. See 
FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 6. 
 15. Id at 6–7. 
 16. XM Radio – Corporate Information, http://xmradio.com/about/corporate-information.xmc 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2008). 
 17. Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 6 (Mar. 31, 2008). 
 18. See FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 8–9; see also Sirius Satellite Radio – Corporate 
Overview, http://www.sirius.com/aboutus (last visited Sept. 28, 2008). 
 and also had a lineup of other sports, news, talk, and 
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entertainment programming, featuring Howard Stern, Martha Stewart, the 
National Football League, the National Association of Stock Car Auto 
Racing, Maxim, ESPN, and coverage of numerous college sports teams.19 
Although both companies had been seeing strong subscriber and revenue 
growth, neither had ever turned a profit.20 This disheartening reality likely 
contributed to their desire to merge.21
B. THE FCC’S INVOLVEMENT IN SATELLITE RADIO 
 
The satellite radio industry is regulated by the FCC under the authority 
of the Communications Act of 1934 (the Act).22 Under the Act, the FCC has 
the “sole power to allocate the electromagnetic spectrum, to establish 
general guidelines of operations and to grant licenses for use of the 
spectrum, which encompasses the entire range of electromagnetic 
frequencies transmitting sound, data, and video.”23 The FCC utilized this 
allocation authority on January 18, 1995, when it “allocate[d] spectrum in 
the 2310–2360 MHz band for [SDARS].”24 Subsequently, on March 3, 
1997, the FCC determined that it would auction all available spectrum 
designated for satellite radio in equal 12.5 MHz pieces to the two highest 
bidders.25 A month later, the Commission announced that XM26 and Sirius 
had been awarded the two SDARS licenses.27
The FCC established the satellite radio industry while simultaneously 
implementing antitrust safeguards.
 
28 Specifically, the FCC imposed two 
important restrictions on the transfer of SDARS licenses.29
                                                                                                                 
 19. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 8–9; Sirius Satellite Radio – Corporate Overview, supra 
note 18. 
 20. David Ellis & Paul R. La Monica, XM, Sirius Announce Merger, http://money.cnn.com/ 
2007/02/19/news/companies/xm_sirius/index (last visited Sept. 28, 2008). 
 21. Joel D. Corriero, Comment, Satellite Radio Monopoly, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423, 424 
(2008). 
 22. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996); Corriero, supra note 21, at 425. 
 23. Aurele Danoff, “Raised Eyebrows” Over Satellite Radio: Has Pacifica Met its Match?, 34 
PEPP. L. REV. 743, 748 (2007). 
 24. FCC, In re Amendment to the Commission’s Rules With Regard to the Establishment and 
Regulation of New Digital Audio Radio Services, 10 F.C.C.R. 2310, 2310 (Jan. 18, 1995). 
 25. See FCC, In re Establishment of Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite 
Service in the 2310-2360 MHz Frequency Band, 12 F.C.C.R. 5754 (Mar. 3, 1997) [hereinafter 
Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service]. 
 26. At the time, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. was known as American Mobile Radio 
Corporation. XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc. – Company History, 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/XM-Satellite-Radio-Holdings-Inc-Company-
History.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2008). 
 27. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 6, 8 (citing FCC, FCC Announces Auction Winners for 
Digital Audio Radio Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 18,727, 18,727 (Apr. 2, 1997) [hereinafter FCC 
Announces Auction Winners]). 
 28. Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service, supra note 25, at 5823–
24. 
 29. Id. at 5823. 
 The first of 
these restrictions was the prohibition of “transfers or assignments of 
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licenses except upon application to the Commission” and upon receiving 
the Commission’s approval.30 Such approval would only be granted upon a 
“demonstrat[ion] that the proposed transaction [would] serve the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity pursuant to [§] 310(d) of the Act.”31 
The second restriction on transfers completely prohibited SDARS license 
holders from transferring their SDARS licenses to each other.32 This 
restriction was implemented to “help assure sufficient continuing 
competition in the provision of [SDARS].”33
C. FCC’S REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED MERGER 
 
Despite the above prohibition on mergers between them, XM and Sirius 
entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger on February 19, 2007 and 
asked for the FCC’s consent to transfer their respective SDARS licenses.34 
In order to reach a decision on the merger, the FCC had to address two 
questions. The first question concerned whether the 1997 rule prohibiting 
the two SDARS license holders from acquiring each other’s license 
constituted a binding rule.35 If the prohibition was binding, then the second 
question the FCC had to answer was whether to “waive, modify, or repeal 
the transfer prohibition” if it found that the merger met the Commission’s 
standard of review.36
1. Standard of Review 
 
The FCC’s standard for reviewing mergers in the communications 
industry is articulated in § 310(d) of the Act.37 This standard states that 
station licenses shall not be transferred “except . . . upon finding by the 
Commission that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be 
served thereby.”38 To such end, the FCC employs a balancing test, 
“weighing any potential public interest harms . . . against any potential 
public interest benefits.”39
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id.; See also 47 C.F.R. § 25.119. 
 Applicants bear the burden of proof under this 
 31. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 5 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1996)). 
 32. Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service, supra note 25, at 5823, 
repealed by FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 75–76. 
 33. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 78. 
 34. Id. at 2–3, 11. 
 35. Id. at 14–15; see also Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service, 
supra note 25, at 78, repealed by FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 75–76. 
 36. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 15. 
 37. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1996); FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
 38. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d). This standard differs from the standard of review used by the Antitrust 
Division of the DOJ, which the DOJ employed when it decided to close its investigation of the 
merger between XM and Sirius. See generally DOJ Decision, supra note 1. “The DOJ reviews 
communications mergers and transactions pursuant to [§] 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits 
mergers that may substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce.”  FCC Decision, 
supra note 8, at 16 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996)). 
 39. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 17. 
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standard.40 Therefore, Sirius and XM needed to prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the merger would, on balance, advance the public 
interest.41
In evaluating whether a merger is in the public interest, the FCC heavily 
considers whether competition in the relevant markets will be “preserv[ed] 
and enhanc[ed].”
  
42 The relevant product and geographic markets are the 
two markets evaluated to determine the horizontal effects of any merger.43 
These markets are typically delineated by the FCC in accordance with the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines by use of the small but significant and 
nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP) test.44 Under the SSNIP test, the 
relevant product market is defined as “the smallest group of competing 
products for which a hypothetical monopoly provider of the products would 
profitably impose” a price increase.45 Similarly, the relevant geographic 
market is defined as “a region such that a hypothetical monopolist that was 
the only present or future producer of the relevant product at locations in 
that region would profitably impose at least a[n] [SSNIP].”46
It is important to carefully define the product and geographic markets 
because horizontal mergers eliminate competition between the merging 
entities, in addition to reducing overall competition in the relevant 
markets.
 
47 Where competition is eliminated and higher concentrations of 
market power result, the public faces a real threat of price increases.48 This 
threat arises from the fact that “[c]ompetition among firms indisputably 
creates powerful incentives for sellers to take steps to attract customers, 
most obviously by keeping prices low.”49 Without competitive pressure, the 
incentive to keep prices low will be diminished or completely eliminated.50
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 17–18; see also 47 U.S.C. § 521(6) (1984) (One purpose of the statute, among others, 
is to “promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary regulation”). The 
FCC also has a “deeply rooted preference for . . . accelerating private sector deployment of 
advanced services, ensuring a diversity of information sources and services to the public, and 
generally managing the spectrum in the public interest.”  FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 17–18. 
 43. DOJ and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, rev. Apr. 8, 1997, §§ 1.1, 1.2, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines]. 
 44. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 20; Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, §§ 1.1, 
1.2 (emphasis removed). 
 45. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 20 (citing Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 
1.11). 
 46. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1.21. 
 47. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 20. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 577 (2007). 
 50. See generally Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 0.1. 
 
The remaining firms will have more market power, giving them “the ability 
profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant 
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period of time.”51 However, market power usually cannot be determined 
without first defining the boundaries of the markets themselves,52
2. The FCC’s Conclusions 
 which is 
why defining the product and geographic markets is an important step. 
The FCC was asked to weigh conflicting opinions and evidence on the 
boundaries of the product market for SDARS.53 The Applicants argued for 
a broad definition of the market, their contention being that satellite radio 
companies are in competition not just with other satellite radio companies 
but with other “audio entertainment services” as well, including “terrestrial 
radio, HD Radio, wireless phones, iPods and other MP3 players.”54 
Commenters and petitioners who opposed the merger55 argued “that 
SDARS constitutes a distinct relevant product market, separate from other 
audio entertainment services.”56
After weighing the arguments made by both sides, the FCC determined 
that there was insufficient evidence “to delineate the boundaries of the 
relevant product market with any precision or confidence.”
 
57 Moreover, the 
FCC was unable to conduct its own analysis of the relevant product market 
due to the fact that “there ha[d] been little or no variation in prices;” since 
the industry’s launch, XM changed its price one time, Sirius never changed 
its price, and terrestrial radio has always been free of charge.58 
Consequently, “without knowing the contours of the relevant product 
market,” it also became impossible for the FCC to determine the boundaries 
of the relevant geographic market.59
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at § 1. 
 53. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21–25. 
 54. Id. at 21. 
 55. Interested parties were permitted to “file petitions to deny, comments, or informal 
comments” with the FCC concerning the Sirius-XM merger “no later than July 9, 2007.”  Public 
Notice, FCC MB Docket No. 07-57 (June 8, 2007), http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/xm-
sirius.html. Commenters who opposed the merger included the Consumer Coalition for 
Competition in Satellite Radio, the National Association of Broadcasters, American Women in 
Radio and Television, the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors, the 
American Antitrust Institute, Blue Sky Services, Entravision Communications Corporation, the 
Prometheus Radio Project, U.S. Senator Herb Kohl (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights), and U.S. Representatives James T. Walsh and John 
McHugh. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21 n.141. 
 56. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21. 
 57. Id. at 22. It did not help the FCC that the DOJ had not defined the relevant product market 
in its own analysis. See DOJ Decision, supra note 1. It also did not help that no commenters 
provided price estimates, cross-price elasticities of demand, or conclusive evidence that terrestrial 
radio is a substitute for SDARS. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21–24. 
 58. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 22. 
 
 59. Id. at 25. The inability to determine the product market meant that it was impossible to 
determine the geographic market. This result can be seen in the following illustration: “[I]f the 
relevant product market were limited to SDARS, [the FCC] could define the relevant geographic 
market as a national market. In contrast, if the relevant product market were to include terrestrial 
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Without definitions of the product and geographic markets, the FCC 
was forced to assume a “worst-case scenario” in evaluating potential 
competitive harms.60 This required assuming that SDARS constituted a 
distinct product market and that the United States constituted the 
geographic market.61 Under this scenario, the FCC found that there were no 
potential entrants that could have reduced the merged entity’s market 
power62 and that “the proposed merger [was] a merger to monopoly” that 
would have “the incentive and ability to raise prices.”63 Other potential 
harms the FCC found were that the merger “would create a vertical 
monopoly in the manufacturing and distribution of satellite radio 
receivers”64 and that it could “result in reduced programming diversity.”65
Despite finding that these harms outweighed any potential benefits of 
the merger,
 
66 the FCC held that the merger was in the public interest 
because of voluntary commitments made by Sirius and XM.67 First, to deal 
with the FCC’s concern about reduced program diversity, Sirius and XM 
made voluntary commitments to offer new programming packages that 
would result in “greater consumer choice” and “two a la carte offerings to 
subscribers.”68 The FCC recognized both of these programming decisions 
as beneficial to the public interest.69 Second, to deal with the FCC’s 
concern that the merger “would create a vertical monopoly in the 
manufacturing and distribution of satellite radio receivers,”70 Sirius and XM 
voluntarily committed to develop interoperable receivers,71 and to “permit 
any device manufacturer to develop equipment that can deliver the 
combined entity’s satellite radio service.”72
                                                                                                                 
radio, [the FCC] would need to adopt a more localized relevant geographic market to reflect the 
fact that terrestrial radio stations have a limited reach.”  Id. 
 60. Id. at 25–26. 
 61. Id. at 26. 
 62. There were no potential entrants because the entire spectrum had already been distributed 
between Sirius and XM, it would have taken years for another company to build up the necessary 
infrastructure, and there were no “uncommitted entrants.” Id. at 26–27. For a discussion about 
“uncommitted entrants,” see Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1.32. 
 63. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 27, 28. 
 64. Id. at 30. This vertical monopoly would adversely impact the public by giving the merged 
entity monopoly pricing power over SDARS receivers and would create “the potential of harming 
consumers by dampening innovation in the[ir] manufacture.”  Id. at 32. 
 65. Id. at 33–34. 
 66. Id. at 44–46. 
 67. Id. at 46. 
 68. Id. at 38–42. 
 69. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 39, 41. 
 70. Id. at 30. 
 71. Id. at 56. An interoperable receiver would allow consumers to access both Sirius and XM’s 
SDARS systems from a single receiver instead of needing a separate receiver for each system. See 
id. at 50. 
 72. Id. at 59. 
 There were several additional 
520 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
voluntary commitments made by Sirius and XM,73
To address concerns about potential price increases to consumers, 
Sirius and XM voluntarily committed not to raise retail prices for thirty-six 
months.
 but the commitment 
most significant to the FCC’s decision to approve the merger was the price 
cap. 
74 The FCC concluded that this commitment would “mitigate the 
harm from any post-merger price increases,” but it wanted additional 
protections.75 Thus, the FCC accepted the Applicants’ price cap 
commitment but also retained the authority to evaluate the price cap six 
months prior to its expiration to determine if it should be “modified, 
removed, or extended.”76 In addition, the FCC mandated that the Applicants 
would not be permitted to adjust the number of channels in any of their 
current packages during the three-year price cap period.77
After finding that the voluntary commitments made by the Applicants 
tipped the balance of harms and benefits toward the latter, the FCC turned 
its attention to the legality of the merger.
 
78 When the FCC established the 
rules and policies for the SDARS industry in 1997, in order to “help assure 
sufficient continuing competition in the provision of [SDARS],” the FCC 
devised a rule which stated, “[e]ven after [SDARS] licenses are granted, 
one licensee will not be permitted to acquire control of the other remaining 
[SDARS] license.”79 The FCC sought comment as to whether this language 
constituted a binding rule and, if so, whether it should be “waive[d], 
modif[ied], or repeal[ed] . . . in the event that the Commission determine[d] 
that the proposed merger, on balance, would serve the public interest.”80 
While the Commission concluded that the rule was in fact binding, the 
Commission also made the decision to repeal the rule since the public 
interest would be served.81
II. THE MISTAKE OF RELYING ON A VOLUNTARY PRICE CAP 
 
The merits of price cap commitments have been hotly contested by U.S. 
antitrust regulatory authorities as of late. While the FCC has rejected the 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Sirius and XM made additional voluntary commitments to allow third party access to 
SDARS capacity, to reserve channels for noncommercial use, and to provide service to Puerto 
Rico. Id. at 60–68. 
 74. This commitment applies to the basic $12.95 per month subscription package and the a la 
carte programming package, among others. Id. at 47. 
 75. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 48. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 73–79. 
 79. Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service, supra note 25, at 5823, 
repealed by FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 75–76. 
 80. FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 4, at 12,018. 
 81. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 73–76. 
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use of pricing plans as recently as 200282 and the legality of instituting such 
plans has been doubted,83 price cap commitments were embraced by the 
FCC in a more recent decision as a way of curbing the potential anti-
competitive effects of mergers on pricing.84 On the other hand, the DOJ and 
FTC have vehemently opposed the use of post-merger price regulations.85
A serious uncertainty problem exists in the SDARS industry: there is 
insufficient data to determine the boundaries of the product and geographic 
markets.
 
Whether or not there is sufficient justification for the implementation of 
voluntary price caps in general, in the specific setting of the Sirius-XM 
merger, it is clear that the arguments against the post-merger price 
regulation far outweigh the potential public interest benefits found by the 
members of the FCC. 
86 Commenters submitted arguments for and against the merger but 
neither side could provide conclusive evidence as to the exact market 
boundaries.87 It did not help that throughout their combined histories, Sirius 
and XM changed their retail prices a grand total of one time, making it 
impossible to estimate the elasticities of demand required to define the 
markets.88
A. INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRICE CAP 
 Thus, the FCC’s decision to rely on the Applicants’ voluntary 
price cap has three main flaws: (1) price caps have proven to be ineffective; 
(2) price caps are anti-competitive; and (3) in this situation, the price cap 
eliminated the FCC’s ability to resolve the uncertainty problem that the 
SDARS industry faces. 
The price cap proposed by the Applicants and accepted by the FCC 
creates a 36-month period during which the Applicants cannot raise their 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See FCC, In re Application of EchoStar Communications Corporation, (A Nevada 
Corporation), General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics Corporation (Delaware 
Corporations) (Transferors) and EchoStar Communications Corporation (a Delaware 
Corporation) (Transferee), 17 F.C.C.R. 20,559, 20,663 (2002) [hereinafter EchoStar]. 
 83. See Farrell Malone & J. Gregory Sidak, Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-
Merger Pricing?, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 471, 484–90 (2007) (arguing that price regulation 
through consent decree may be unlawful because there is no clear legislative authority to do so 
and that it also might be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers); see also J. 
Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and 
Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the 
Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 697, 748–49 (2008) (stating that “Congress has not delegated to the FCC the power to 
regulate SDARS rates, and no delegation can be inferred”). 
 84. See FCC, In re AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of Control, 
22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5807–08 (2007) (the FCC accepted the voluntary commitment made by AT&T 
and BellSouth to offer a fixed $10 price per month for DSL service to new customers and to 
continue that policy for 30 months). 
 85. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 86. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 22, 25. 
 87. Id. at 20–25. Public comments regarding the merger were filed pursuant to the FCC’s 
Public Notice of June 8, 2007, supra note 55. 
 88. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21–22. 
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prices on some specifically enumerated programming packages.89
1. Not All Pricing Elements Were Taken Into Account 
 History 
shows that this regulation will prove to be ineffective during this 36-month 
period because (1) the price cap fails to account for non-retail pricing, and 
(2) Sirius-XM will have an incentive to reduce its programming quality. In 
addition, the price cap will fail to effectively prevent monopoly pricing 
behavior since the Applicants will have the ability to raise prices once the 
price cap expires. 
One of the shortcomings of the price cap is that it “suffers from a 
myopic perception of satellite radio pricing.”90 The voluntary commitment 
to cap retail prices applies to several explicitly enumerated programming 
packages.91 What it fails to account for, however, are the numerous other 
“implicit pricing elements of the service, such as equipment subsidies, 
ancillary services, activations fees, terminations fee, and transfer fees”92 
(Implicit Pricing Elements). As a result, the Applicants can simply raise the 
prices they currently charge for these Implicit Pricing Elements to 
compensate for their inability to price-gouge consumers on retail pricing.93 
For example, Sirius currently charges a retail fee of $12.95 per month94 and 
an activation fee of $15.00.95 In this example, Sirius decides that, with the 
monopoly power it obtained in the merger with XM, it would like to 
increase retail prices from $12.95 per month to $13.95 per month; however, 
the retail price cap implemented by the FCC prevents Sirius from doing so. 
Despite the cap, Sirius would still be able to gouge its consumers for the 
extra $1.00 per month. Sirius could do so simply by increasing its uncapped 
one-time activation fee from $15.00 to $27.00, thus realizing the same 
$12.00 gain that year as it would have if the price cap had not prevented it 
from raising its monthly retail price. The failure to cap activation fees and 
the other Implicit Pricing Elements in conjunction with the cap on retail 
prices thus “undermine[s] the consumer protection intent of the price cap”96
                                                                                                                 
 89. This list includes their “per month subscription package, their a la carte programming 
package, their ‘best of both’ programming packages, their ‘mostly music’ and their ‘news, sports, 
and talk’ programming packages, and their discounted family-friendly programming package.”  
Id. at 47. 
 90. Id. at 99 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 47. 
 92. Id. at 99–100 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting); see also Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at 
746, 751. 
 93. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 99–100 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting); Sidak & Singer, 
supra note 83, at 746. 
 94. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 47. 
 95. Sirius Terms and Conditions, http://shop.sirius.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2008). 
 96. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 99–100 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 
and the FCC’s entire premise for approving the merger. 
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2. Decrease in Quality of Programming is a Likely Result 
As was previously noted, the voluntary commitment consists of an 
agreement not to raise the prices on specifically enumerated programming 
packages,97 and the Applicants also cannot change the number of channels 
in any of these packages.98 These regulations, however, do nothing to 
inhibit the Applicants’ ability to reduce the quality of their programming 
packages by increasing advertising or by moving popular shows to 
uncapped packages for which they could charge more money. The Chief 
Executive Officer of Sirius, Mel Karmazin, has already stated that “the 
advertising line is going to contribute significantly in the future towards 
[average revenue per user],”99 hinting that increased advertising is on the 
way. The DOJ has come out against the use of conduct remedies100
Conduct remedies suffer from at least four potential substantial costs that a 
structural remedy can in principle avoid . . . [for instance], there are the 
indirect costs associated with efforts by the merged firm to evade the 
remedy’s “spirit” while not violating its letter. As one example, a 
requirement that the merged firm not raise price may lead it profitably, 
and inefficiently, to reduce its costs by cutting back on quality — thereby 
effecting an anticompetitive increase in the “quality adjusted” price.
 
specifically for this very reason, stating: 
101
An illustration of the adverse impact that pricing regulations can have 
on product quality can be seen in the ongoing regulatory debate concerning 
a la carte pricing of television networks on cable and satellite systems.
 
102 
Generally, consumers of television programming advocate a la carte pricing 
policies because they believe that they will benefit from only having to pay 
for the channels that they watch.103 Nevertheless, the customary practice for 
television providers is to sell channels together in bundles.104
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id. at 47. 
 98. Id. at 48. 
 99. Sirius Satellite Radio Inc. & XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transcript of Investor 
Conference Call (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908937/ 
000095012307002469/y30604be425.htm. 
 100. Conduct remedies “entail[] injunctive provisions that would, in effect, manage or regulate 
the merged firm’s postmerger business conduct.”  DOJ, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Division Policy 
Guide to Merger Remedies, Part III (Oct. 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
guidelines/205108.pdf [hereinafter Policy Guide to Merger Remedies]. 
 101. Id. at Part III.A. 
 102. Sirius and XM have also voluntarily committed to implement an à la carte policy for 
SDARS as part of the merger agreement. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 47. 
 103. Thomas W. Hazlett, Shredding Tiers for A La Carte? An Economic Analysis of Cable TV 
Pricing, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 253, 257 (2006). 
 104. Id. at 262. 
 Research has 
shown, despite conventional wisdom, that when a la carte rate regulations 
were imposed on cable TV systems, consumers actually suffered rather than 
benefited because “cable operators and cable networks responded to these 
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constraints by altering the nature, packaging, and quality of video 
programming services.”105
3. Prices Will Rise When the Price Cap Expires 
 These same adverse consequences can 
reasonably be expected from the price caps on Sirius XM Radio Inc.’s 
programming packages. 
There is yet another question which the 36-month price cap on the 
Applicants’ programming packages fails to address: what happens after the 
cap expires? It is true that the FCC implemented some precautionary 
measures concerning the cap, such as retaining the authority to evaluate the 
price cap six months prior to its expiration to determine if it should be 
“modified, removed, or extended,”106 yet there is nothing to prevent the 
Applicants from raising prices once the price cap expires. The cap can be 
easily overcome, as it literally tells the Applicants on which day they can 
increase their retail prices. Furthermore, considering that there are no 
potential entrants into the market,107 there will be no competitive forces to 
naturally prevent Sirius XM Radio Inc. from raising its prices.108
B. PRICE CAPS ARE ANTI-COMPETITIVE 
 
By approving the merger of Sirius and XM in reliance on a price cap, 
the FCC majority “assert[ed] that satellite radio consumers will be better 
served by a regulated monopoly than by marketplace competition.”109 Such 
a ruling “is antithetical to the deregulatory movement at the FCC over the 
past decade”110 and its governing law,111
In 2002, the FCC received an application from EchoStar 
Communications Corporation (EchoStar), General Motors Corporation 
(GM), and Hughes Electronics Corporation (Hughes), collectively, “to 
transfer control of various Commission authorizations, including direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS),” to New EchoStar.
 which advocate competition over 
regulation. 
112
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. at 258. 
 106. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 48. 
 107. Id. at 26–27. 
 108. Market entrants are recognized as having the ability to impact post-merger prices. Thus, if 
the possibility existed for new firms to enter the SDARS market, then the possibility would have 
remained open that firms could enter the market and prevent Sirius-XM, via the forces of 
competition, from raising its prices after the expiration of the price cap. See Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, supra note 43, § 3.0. 
 109. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 96 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 110. Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at 746. 
 111. 47 U.S.C. § 521(6). 
 112. EchoStar, supra note 82, at 20,561. New EchoStar would provide DBS services under the 
name DirecTV. Id. 
 It was in this opinion that 
the FCC stated its policy that market competition is preferable to regulated 
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monopolies.113 As in the Sirius-XM merger, the EchoStar merger was a 
merger that would combine the two largest providers of the service into a 
single entity.114 Another parallel to the Sirius-XM merger was the concern 
that if the merger was approved, the newly merged entity, New EchoStar, 
would be able to raise prices as a result of increased market power.115 
Particularly, it was feared that New EchoStar “would be able to raise prices 
and exploit its dominant position in geographic regions not served by cable 
systems.”116 To combat these concerns, EchoStar, GM, and Hughes 
“promise[d] to remedy the merger’s potential anticompetitive effects in 
areas not served by cable competitors with a ‘national pricing plan.’”117
In essence, what Applicants propose is that we approve the replacement of 
viable facilities-based competition with regulation. This can hardly be said 
to be consistent with either the Communications Act or with contemporary 
regulatory policy and goals, all of which aim at replacing, wherever 
possible, the regulatory safeguards needed to ensure consumer welfare in 
communications markets served by a single provider, with free market 
competition, and particularly with facilities-based competition. Simply 
stated, the Applicants’ proposed remedy is the antithesis of the 1996 Act’s 
“pro-competitive, de-regulatory” policy direction.
 
Unlike the FCC of 2008, the FCC of 2002 rejected the proposed 
“national pricing plan” as inconsistent with the goals of the FCC. In its 
holding, the Commission stated its clear preference for competition over 
regulation: 
118
The FTC and DOJ have similarly objected to the practice of allowing 
mergers based on assurances that the merging companies will not raise 
prices. Their objections rest “on the grounds that . . . competition is the 
proper driving force for policy decisions.”
 
119 They believe that “community 
commitments are an ineffective short-term regulatory approach to what is 
ultimately a problem of competition.”120
                                                                                                                 
 113. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 96–97 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 114. EchoStar, supra note 82, at 20,561; FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 4, at 
12,018. 
 115. EchoStar, supra note 82, at 20,626. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 20,579. 
 118. Id. at 20,663 (emphasis removed). 
 119. Mary Lou Steptoe & David Balto, Finding the Right Prescription: The FTC’s Use of 
Innovative Merger Remedies, 10 ANTITRUST 16 (1995). 
 120. FTC, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition, 2004 WL 1685795 (July 2004). 
 Clearly then, the decision of the 
FCC to opt in favor of a regulated monopolist, Sirius XM Radio Inc., over 
the continued market competition between Sirius and XM, is irreconcilable 
with the policies of the FCC, FTC, and DOJ. 
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C. THE UNCERTAINTY PROBLEM 
1. Definition of an Uncertainty Problem and How it is 
Remedied 
Regulatory authorities often make decisions about competition policy in 
the face of uncertainty.121 Uncertainty is created by the fact that in many 
situations, there is simply no way to predict the future impact of 
implemented policies.122 When such uncertainty exists, enforcement of 
regulatory policies has a certain experimental character that makes the 
manner in which remedies are implemented especially important.123
When an administrative agency has determined that certain conduct 
should be regulated, there are two methods available to it to enforce its 
standards: ex ante and ex post.
 
124 Under an ex ante enforcement 
mechanism, the administrative agency reviews and must either reject or 
provide preapproval or preclearance for the conduct.125 By contrast, ex post 
enforcement involves an evaluation of the conduct after the fact rather than 
before it transpires.126
The ex ante approach to regulation faces serious disadvantages when 
uncertainty problems exist in comparison to the ex post approach.
 
127 Since 
ex ante regulation “requires agencies to make enforcement decisions before 
the regulated activity has occurred,” regulatory agencies may be forced to 
make predictions about future conduct based on “a limited, sometimes 
inadequate record.”128 The regulatory agencies may also be forced to rely 
on the applicant’s own description of its proposed conduct in order to 
predict the impact of the conduct.129 This suggests that “in contexts where a 
complete record may be especially helpful (or necessary) in identifying 
violations or determining their nature or severity,” as when considering 
whether a merger will be anticompetitive, “ex ante enforcement may be 
inadvisable.”130 Thus, in the face of uncertainty problems, “waiting to see 
what happens, i.e., relying on ex post enforcement, may be the least costly 
and error-prone alternative.”131
                                                                                                                 
 121. William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments of 
Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 843, 
844 (2001). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative 
Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1278 (1999). 
 125. Id. at 1282–83. 
 126. Id. at 1281–82. 
 127. Id. at 1319. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 1319. 
 131. Id. 
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Despite the advantages of ex post enforcement in the face of 
uncertainty, the FCC is required by law to preassess transfers of radio 
license control to make sure that the transfer “will serve the public interest, 
convenience and necessity.”132 Since the FCC cannot wait to take ex post 
action, the next best option for dealing with uncertainty problems is to 
conduct ex post monitoring “to determine whether the assumptions and 
hypotheses that motivated the decision[s] . . . were sound.”133
Research and ex post testing of the decisions made by regulatory 
authorities are essential in contexts characterized by uncertainty.
 
134 The 
development of sound government policy that can sufficiently protect the 
interests of the public depends on generating knowledge concerning the 
“wisdom of choices past,” as it will lead to a better “[u]nderstanding [of] 
the effects of previous government initiatives” and allow agencies to gain 
“valuable insights about designing future policies.”135 These studies can 
reduce the uncertainty of future decisions by “illuminating the accuracy of 
various theories in diagnosing business conduct or predicting competitive 
effects and informing judgments about the impact of various remedies.”136
Studies conducted by the FTC’s Bureau of Economics (Bureau), which 
were ex post assessments of several government regulations, are illustrative 
examples of how ex post assessments of regulatory decisions can lead to 
better policies.
 
137 One such study was conducted by the Bureau after 
Congress passed the Nutrition Education and Labeling Act of 1990 
(NLEA).138 The NLEA allowed companies to make some health claims on 
product labels and advertisements but prohibited many others about 
promising scientific findings, “even when the downside risk from 
consuming foods based on the claims was negligible and the manufacturer 
accurately portrayed the level of scientific support for the claims.”139 The 
Bureau investigated the impact of this regulation and found that it 
negatively impacted the public by “stifl[ing] the flow of health information 
to consumers” and by “result[ing] in significantly less information about 
nutrition and health attributes in advertising.”140 Another of the Bureau’s 
studies was conducted to test new mortgage disclosure requirements 
proposed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).141
                                                                                                                 
 132. 47 C.F.R. § 25.119. 
 133. Kovacic, supra note 121, at 846. 
 134. Id. at 856. 
 135. Id. at 843. See also Luke Froeb, Daniel Hosken & Janis Pappalardo, Economics Research 
at the FTC: Information, Retrospectives, and Retailing, 25 REV. INDUS. ORG. 353, 370–71 (2004). 
 136. Kovacic, supra note 121, at 846–47. 
 137. See Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 355–61. 
 138. Id. at 357. 
 139. Id. at 357–58. 
 140. Id. at 358. 
 141. Id. at 360. 
 The study found that the requirements would cost consumers 
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millions of dollars per year because more people had difficulty determining 
the price of loans when the mortgage forms contained the disclosures.142
The Bureau’s ex post assessments of the FDA and HUD policies 
showed the beneficial impact that research can have on regulatory decisions 
made in uncertain situations. Neither agency knew how their regulatory 
policies would impact the public, but the Bureau’s studies provided 
evidence on the consequences of the policies.
 
143 As a result of the Bureau’s 
investigations, the FDA adjusted its policies on health claims in 
advertising,144 and HUD took its proposal to increase mortgage disclosures 
off the table.145
The importance of conducting research to remedy uncertainty problems 
in antitrust merger policy is especially pronounced.
 
146 Ex post assessments 
are viewed as “essential to effective government policy”147 when it comes 
to competition, particularly in the face of technological change.148 These 
assessments “allow us to sharpen our understanding of which mergers are 
likely (and unlikely) to be anticompetitive.”149 One prerequisite to 
conducting ex post assessments of antitrust merger decisions, though, is the 
need for data in order to conduct analyses of mergers’ effects.150 Qualitative 
data, such as documents and testimonials, may be helpful, but it is 
quantitative data that economists and lawyers have principally relied on to 
conduct these assessments.151
2. The Price Cap Will Not Resolve the Uncertainty Problem 
 
The FCC, in evaluating the proposed merger between Sirius and XM, 
confronted an uncertainty problem. The uncertainty arose from the 
insufficiency of information that was needed to establish the product and 
geographic markets for SDARS.152 Specifically, there was insufficient 
pricing information to calculate cross-price elasticities of demand.153 As a 
result, the FCC approved the merger under the presumption that the 
voluntary commitments made it more likely than not that the merger would 
be in the public interest.154
                                                                                                                 
 142. Id. at 361. 
 143. See Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 358, 361. 
 144. Id. at 359. 
 145. Id. at 361. 
 146. Kovacic, supra note 121, at 843. 
 147. Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 370. 
 148. Kovacic, supra note 121, at 843. 
 149. Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 371. 
 150. Id. at 366. 
 151. Id. at 366–67. 
 152. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 22, 25. 
 153. Thomas W. Hazlett, Some Dynamics of High-Tech Merger Analysis in General and with 
Respect to XM-Sirius, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 753, 757 (2008). 
 154. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 46. 
 It also accepted a price cap on Sirius and XM’s 
current prices without research as to whether these prices were the most 
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efficient.155 Comparable situations have arisen in the past156 and the results 
have been poor.157 Here, the FCC had no choice but to make an ex ante 
decision regarding the merger,158 but because an uncertainty problem 
existed in the SDARS market, it was important for the Commission to at 
least leave open the possibility that meaningful ex post monitoring of the 
merger could be conducted.159
One explanation for the impossibility of conducting a meaningful ex 
post assessment of the Sirius-XM merger is that the FCC did not lower the 
barriers to entry into the SDARS industry. Market entrants (even potential 
ones) have the ability to impact post-merger prices.
 Yet, there are two explanations why the 
FCC’s approval of the Sirius-XM merger did not leave open this possibility. 
160 Thus, if the 
possibility existed for new firms to enter the SDARS industry, then Sirius 
XM Radio Inc. might have felt pressure to lower their prices below the 
price cap,161 resulting in demand changes and quantitative data for 
research.162 However, an entrant into the SDARS industry would bear the 
brunt of some very significant costs. For example, there are “significant 
fixed costs of establishing a nationwide radio network.”163 These costs, in 
addition to the costs endured to develop technology, market products, and 
develop a client base, exceeded $5 billion to both Sirius and XM.164 There 
are also the costs of acquiring spectrum that a new SDARS provider would 
need to concern itself with.165 Not only would a new SDARS company have 
to purchase spectrum—an acquisition that cost both Sirius and XM more 
than $83 million166
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. at 47–48. 
 156. See, e.g., FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F.Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
 157. The FTC lost in its request for an injunction to prevent the merger of Butterworth Health 
Corporation and Blodgett Memorial Medical Center, the two largest acute care hospitals in Grand 
Rapids, Michigan. Id. at 1288, 1303. The court accepted the FTC’s evidence that the proposed 
merger would result in two near-monopolies yet it allowed the merger due to the “Community 
Commitments” made, which included post-merger price regulations. Id. at 1294, 1298, 1302–03. 
Later, studies would show that “several health plans believed that they were paying more . . . than 
they most likely would have been absent the merger.”  David Balto & Maleah Geertsma, Why 
Hospital Merger Antitrust Enforcement Remains Necessary: A Retrospective on the Butterworth 
Merger, 34 J. HEALTH L. 129, 154 (2001) (since renamed J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI.). 
 158. See 47 C.F.R. § 25.119(a) (“You must file an application for Commission authorization 
before you can transfer, assign, dispose of (voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or 
by transfer of control of any corporation or any other entity) your station license or accompanying 
rights. The Commission will grant your application only if it finds that doing so will serve the 
public interest, convenience and necessity.”). 
 159. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 160. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 3.0. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 366–67. 
 163. Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at 736. 
 164. Corriero, supra note 21, at 426. 
 165. Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at 736. 
 166. FCC Announces Auction Winners, supra note 27, at 18,727. 
—but “because there is physically no other spectrum 
allocated for SDARS, the acquisition of spectrum by an entrant would 
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entail not just buying spectrum, but also convincing the FCC to allocate 
additional spectrum for an additional SDARS provider.”167
A second explanation for the impossibility of conducting meaningful ex 
post research of the merger is the impact of the price cap. In competitive 
markets, when a seller makes the decision to adjust the price of its product, 
the level at which that product is consumed will subsequently adjust as 
well; if the seller decides to raise prices, then consumption will typically 
fall, while if the seller reduces prices, consumption will typically rise.
 Consequently, 
because of these significant barriers, entry of a new SDARS provider is 
highly unlikely. 
168 
Sellers might also adjust their prices in response to shifts in consumer 
demand.169 Typically, if demand rises, prices will follow.170 On the other 
hand, if demand falls, prices will be adjusted downward as well.171 All of 
these adjustments in prices and consumption produce quantitative data 
which can be used to analyze such things as the substitutability of certain 
goods and the boundaries of markets.172
D. CONCLUSION 
 Thus, in a post-merger market 
where prices and consumption can freely adjust to one-another, the 
possibility of collecting quantitative data to conduct research is great. 
Imposing a price cap, on the other hand, will impede these adjustments 
from taking place. As a result, the data which is used to evaluate the 
boundaries of markets and to measure the substitutability of different 
products—information which can be used to solve market uncertainty—will 
not be produced. The FCC’s decision to impose a price cap is therefore 
flawed in that it fails to enlighten the FCC as to the SDARS market’s 
elasticity and to alleviate the uncertainty problem that exists in the SDARS 
industry. 
The price cap relied on by the FCC is a flawed solution. Not only do 
past experiences with price caps indicate that it will be ineffective,173 but it 
is also against FCC policy174 and will inhibit the government from learning 
anything about the SDARS market that could benefit future policy 
decisions.175
                                                                                                                 
 167. Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at 736. 
 168. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 20–24 (3d ed. 
1979). 
 169. Id. at 33–34. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See A. ASIMAKOPULOS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC THEORY: MICROECONOMICS 
23–35 (1978). 
 173. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 174. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 175. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 It is thus readily clear that, when evaluating the merits of 
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proposed mergers that are plagued by uncertainty, regulatory agencies 
would be ill advised to rest their approval upon any price caps. 
III. PROPOSED POLICY FOR MERGERS PLAGUED BY 
UNCERTAINTY 
While the FCC erroneously based its decision to approve the Sirius-XM 
merger on the voluntary price cap, not everyone shared the Commission’s 
position on the appropriate remedy. Hoards of both proponents and 
opponents of the merger advocated far simpler solutions—for the 
proponents, it was outright approval of the merger; for the opponents, it was 
outright rejection. While each side put forth meritorious arguments, when 
faced with a market whose contours are uncertain, as is the case with 
SDARS, neither position leads to an optimal outcome. Rather, the middle 
ground—approving mergers and subsequently conducting ex post 
evaluations—is the best solution in the face of uncertainty. 
A. THE FLAW OF THE OUTRIGHT APPROVAL AND REJECTION 
SOLUTIONS 
When the Sirius-XM merger proposal was announced, over 17,000 
formal and informal comments poured into the FCC advocating their 
writers’ and constituencies’ positions.176 Many of these statements argued 
for outright approval of the merger because of the public interest benefits to 
consumers. When horizontal mergers are consummated, oftentimes 
efficiencies are generated which “can enhance the merged firm’s ability and 
incentive to compete, . . . result[ing] in lower prices, improved quality, 
enhanced services, or new products.”177 These were some of the benefits 
that the merger proponents,178 the FCC,179 and the DOJ foresaw.180
                                                                                                                 
 176. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 15. 
 177. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 4. 
 178. Comment of American Trucking Associations, Inc., FCC MB Docket No. 07-57, June 21, 
2007, available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ 
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6519537861 (improved offerings); Comment of General Motors Corporation, FCC MB Docket 
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=pdf&id_document=6519816756 (programming packages at lower prices); Comment of National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, FCC MB Docket No. 07-57, June 20, 2007, 
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document 
=6519558853 (lower prices). 
 179. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 44–46. 
 In 
 180. DOJ Decision, supra note 1, at 4 (“[T]he Division estimated the likely variable cost 
savings—those savings most likely to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices to be 
substantial. For example, the merger is likely to allow the parties to consolidate development, 
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addition, efficiencies from horizontal mergers sometimes “result in benefits 
in the form of new or improved products.”181 Proponents of the merger 
foresaw these efficiencies as another public interest benefit for 
consumers,182 as did the FCC.183 There were additional proponents of the 
merger who advocated for outright approval based on the financial 
difficulties of Sirius and XM,184 but because the Applicants “did not seek 
approval on the basis of financial distress,” the FCC did not take this into 
consideration.185
On the opposite end of the spectrum are those who advocated for the 
outright rejection of the merger. When markets become highly concentrated 
with just a small number of firms, the capacity of those firms to increase 
prices and decrease output (including innovation) rises.
 
186 The proponents 
of outright rejection believed their remedy to be the most beneficial to the 
public interest because it would preserve market competition, thus 
inhibiting the ability of the firms to raise prices.187
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(Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting); Comment of Members of Congress to Alberto R. Gonzales, 
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permitted to merge); Declaration of J. Gregory Sidak filed by The Consumer Coalition for 
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Radio Project, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, & Media Access Project, FCC MB Docket 
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the solution advocated by FCC Commissioners Copps and Adelstein,188 and 
it would have been the winning position had just one additional 
commissioner sided with them.189
Despite the potential merits of each of these positions, both solutions 
are flawed when there is uncertainty about the parameters and dynamics of 
the relevant markets. Proponents of merger approval assume that the merger 
will not result in a monopoly and proponents of merger rejection assume 
that the merger will result in a monopoly, but neither of these outcomes is 
even more probable than the other when the information before the 
regulator is insufficient to delineate the relevant markets. The proponents of 
outright approval emphasized the great public interest benefits that would 
arise from the efficiencies generated by the Sirius-XM merger; however, if 
their implicit assumption that the merger will not result in a monopoly or 
near-monopoly is false, then those efficiency gains are moot.
 
190 On the 
other side, the outright rejection proponents emphasized the need to reject 
the merger in order to preserve competition and prevent monopolization.191
B. PROPOSAL: MERGER APPROVAL CONDITIONED UPON 
SUBSEQUENT EX POST MONITORING AND EVALUATIONS 
  
However, if their assumption that the merger will result in a monopoly or 
near-monopoly is incorrect, then this remedy will have deprived consumers 
of the potential benefits of efficiency gains by preventing the merger. 
1. Rationale 
While both the proponents and opponents of the Sirius-XM merger 
made strong arguments in support of their positions, when the parameters of 
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 188. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 96–97 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting); see also id. at 98–103 
(Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 189. Republican Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate represented the undecided swing vote. 
Peter Kaplan, Republican FCC Commissioner Key to XM-Sirius Vote, REUTERS, July 1, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/industryNews/idUSN0126213820080702. She expressed 
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Commissioners. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 104–08 (Tate, Comm’r, concurring); Kaplan, 
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 191. See generally id. 
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the concerned product and geographic markets are uncertain, such 
arguments should be considered good guesses at best.192 It is entirely 
possible that the proponents of approving the merger outright will be 
proven correct in predicting that market efficiencies created by the merger 
will benefit consumers,193 but it is also probable that the merger will result 
in a monopoly194
The policy of conditioning antitrust remedies on ex post evaluations is 
not a new one. As of late, there has been an increased willingness of 
regulators to intervene in closed mergers to consider novel remedies or 
approaches.
 or that the impact of the merger will be something nobody 
could have predicted ex ante. The bottom line is, given the level of 
uncertainty, there is no way of knowing ex ante what the impact of the 
settled-upon remedy will be.  For this reason, in situations where the market 
parameters cannot be defined, a compromise between the outright approval 
and outright rejection positions may be the best solution. Such a solution is 
merger approval conditioned upon subsequent ex post monitoring and 
evaluations (Approval and Monitoring Remedy). 
195 A prime example of such an action was the reliance on ex 
post evaluations in the merger of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp. 
(ENH) and Highland Park Hospital (Highland Park).196 In 2000, ENH, 
which owned two hospitals in the north-Chicago suburbs (Evanston 
Hospital and Glenbrook Hospital), acquired a third hospital in the area 
(Highland Park).197 Two years later, on August 28, 2002, the FTC 
“announced the formation of the Merger Litigation Task Force,” 
“responsible for reinvigorating the Commission’s hospital merger program, 
which include[d] a review of, and potential challenge to, consummated 
transactions that may have resulted in anticompetitive price increases.”198 
Pursuant to this “hospital-merger retrospective-review,” the FTC filed a 
complaint against the ENH-Highland Park merger in February 2004.199
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 193. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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Using ex post evidence that, during the years since the merger was 
consummated, ENH had “raised its prices by significantly more than 
comparable hospitals because of market power gained through the 
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merger,”200 the FTC successfully proved that ENH had violated § 7 of the 
Clayton Act by making an acquisition that substantially lessened 
competition.201
The use of ex post monitoring has not been limited to merger remedies. 
For instance, it has been implemented as part of a remedy to an illegal 
monopolization claim against Microsoft. In 1994, the U.S. government 
began a series of antitrust battles with Microsoft.
 
202 The government’s 
prosecution was based on Microsoft’s “attempt[s] to forestall the growth of 
middleware applications,” such as the Netscape Browser and the Java 
Virtual Machine, through various practices.203 The government claimed 
Microsoft had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act204 “through its practices 
directed at Netscape and Java . . . aiming to protect its operating system 
monopoly by extinguishing the threat that the middleware applications 
could undermine or replace the ubiquitous Windows operating system.”205 
Ultimately, Microsoft was found liable by the D.C. Circuit;206 however, 
instead of continuing the litigation to the remedial stage, the DOJ 
negotiated a remedial decree with Microsoft207 which included an elaborate 
ex post monitoring system to ensure that Microsoft complied, but also to 
evaluate future developments in the relevant markets.208
Despite the use of ex post monitoring in merger cases such as Evanston, 
the Approval and Monitoring Remedy is not without its faults. One flaw is 
that such a policy could require approving mergers that will lead to the 
formation of a monopoly or near-monopoly, thus realizing in the short run 
all the fears of those who advocated for the outright rejection of the Sirius-
XM merger.
 
209 Also, judicial reversals of mergers could give rise to “a state 
of uncertainty . . . . Such a situation of uncertainty lasting a number of 
months or even years could have negative effects on the participating 
undertakings and on the markets generally.”210
The adverse consequences that the Approval and Monitoring Remedy 
could have are real, but they are dwarfed by the positive effects. Under the 
proposed policy, it is possible mergers may be allowed that will lead to 
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monopolies or near monopolies, but such monopolizations will be short-
lived because the regulator can implement corrective measures in such 
cases. Furthermore, the negative impact of creating uncertainty in the 
market will be outweighed by the positive impact of improved outcomes for 
consumers, which this policy is best positioned to accomplish. While ex 
ante merger decisions in uncertain markets can only use pre-merger 
evidence to make predictions about the proposed merger’s potential 
impact,211 the Approval and Monitoring Remedy can use the “evidence of 
the merger’s actual effects on a market.”212 “In particular, the courts [will] 
be able to scrutinize the merged entity’s behavior for any anticompetitive 
signs in a post-merger environment” and “[t]he agencies [will] also have 
more opportunity to conduct probative economic studies and seek evidence 
from affected customers, suppliers, and competitors.”213
This approach also includes two additional advantages. First, 
reevaluations based on ex post studies “may translate into longer and more 
‘bullet proof’ reviews that are more likely to withstand challenges in courts 
as well as in the public domain.”
 Thus, after ex post 
assessments, regulatory agencies will be far better situated to evaluate 
mergers. 
214 Second, as was previously demonstrated 
by the studies of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, the policy could help 
guide and improve future policy decisions by providing regulators with 
useful information about the impact of their previously implemented 
policies.215
2. Implementation 
 For all these reasons, the benefits of the Approval and 
Monitoring Remedy outweigh its flaws. 
The process of implementing the Approval and Monitoring Remedy 
requires four steps: (1) determine that there is a sufficient level of ex ante 
uncertainty; (2) approve the proposed merger; (3) conduct an ex post 
assessment of the consummated merger; and (4) take action based on the 
results of the ex post assessments. First, a determination that the product 
and geographic markets of the merging firms cannot be delineated is one 
possible finding that would establish an uncertainty problem. If the markets 
can be delineated, then there is no uncertainty problem and the regulatory 
agency can make its determination as to approving or rejecting the proposed 
merger as it sees fit. 
After establishing that an uncertainty problem exists, the second step in 
the process is to approve the merger.216
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 However, the regulator should have 
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the freedom to err on the side of caution if there are strong reasons for 
doing so. For example, in a merger environment where there is a large 
consumer base and it is believed that there are no product substitutes, a 
regulator should have the freedom to reject the merger outright. On the 
other hand, in a situation such as Sirius-XM where it is likely that terrestrial 
radio is a viable substitute for satellite radio, the regulator should approve 
the merger at this stage. 
Merger approval is followed by the third step: conducting ex post 
monitoring and assessment of the consummated merger. The goal of these 
assessments is to determine the impacts of the merger that could not be 
anticipated ex ante, including any anticompetitive impact. Quantitative data, 
such as variations in retail price, must be gathered to determine the precise 
anticompetitive impact of the merger,217 but qualitative data concerning the 
anticompetitive impacts of the merger, such as testimonial evidence from 
customers, suppliers, executives, and competitors, can be used as well.218
How the ex post assessments are to be conducted is for the regulatory 
agency to determine. The agency can conduct the assessment itself or it can 
devise a process similar to the one created by the DOJ for the Microsoft 
settlement in which third parties and expert committees were involved.
 
219 In 
that situation, the DOJ monitored Microsoft through multiple channels, 
including peer evaluators (“a court appointed technical committee of 
experts”),220 Microsoft’s own internal compliance unit, and a joint status 
reporting system with reports produced by both the DOJ and Microsoft that 
“describ[ed] and evaluat[ed] Microsoft’s compliance with the remedy 
decree.”221 The advantages of this method include the ability to tap into the 
“on-the-ground expertise” of third parties, to “promote[] learning by all 
who are involved in the process,” and to adjust strategies based on the 
content of the status reports.222
The final step of the Approval and Monitoring Remedy consists of 
evaluating the ex post assessments and taking appropriate action based on 
the results. The ex post assessments could lead to a finding that the merger 
had no anticompetitive impact or that it did. If the ex post evaluations show 
that approving the merger had no anticompetitive impact, then it should be 
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left alone. However, if an anticompetitive impact is seen in the assessments, 
the regulatory agency has the option to impose either a structural remedy or 
a conduct remedy.223 Structural remedies “generally will involve the sale of 
physical assets by the merging firms” while “conduct remed[ies] usually 
entail[] injunctive provisions that would, in effect, manage or regulate the 
merged firm’s postmerger business conduct.”224 Structural remedies are the 
preferred remedy of the DOJ in merger cases since, compared to conduct 
remedies, “they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly 
government entanglement in the market.”225 Moreover, structural remedies 
are the normal remedy for a consummated but anticompetitive merger, as 
divestitures often may be used “to restore the status quo.”226
Despite regulatory agencies’ preference for structural remedies, there 
have been instances where conduct remedies have been used instead to curb 
the anticompetitive effects of a consummated merger. For example, the 
remedy that the FTC employed after successfully challenging the Evanston 
Hospital merger was a conduct remedy.
 
227 Originally, Administrative Law 
Judge Stephen J. McGuire found in favor of the FTC and held that 
“divestiture [was] the most effective and appropriate remedy.”228 
Accordingly, he ruled that ENH must sell Highland Park.229 However, the 
divestiture McGuire mandated was vacated on appeal in favor of a conduct 
remedy.230 Rather than force ENH to divest itself from Highland Park, the 
FTC mandated that ENH and Highland Park negotiate separately with 
payors and that they also have separate negotiating teams to compete with 
one another.231 This switch from a structural remedy to a conduct remedy 
was made because the FTC felt that divestiture would be too difficult to 
implement since “the hospitals had been integrated for over seven years and 
. . . the quality improvements and efficiencies from the merger would be 
lost.”232 Still, the FTC emphasized that conduct remedies should only be 
used on a very limited basis and that “[d]ivestiture is the preferred remedy 
for challenges to unlawful mergers.”233
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 Hence, if ex post evaluations of the 
merger show an anticompetitive effect, a structural remedy should be 
employed to account for such effect unless, in the regulator’s judgment, it 
would be too difficult to implement. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The FCC committed a serious error by relying on a voluntary price cap 
in its approval of the Sirius-XM merger. Not only is the cap deficient on its 
own terms since it applies only to retail prices and has a 36-month 
enforcement period, but it has an added negative impact when applied in the 
satellite radio industry, an industry with uncertain market boundaries—it 
inhibits the resolution of the uncertainty problem by eliminating the 
possibility of price changes that could have produced data for analysis. 
Ex post assessments of mergers are vital to learn about competition in 
markets and to improve antitrust policies, and they should be the focal point 
when evaluating merger proposals in markets plagued by uncertainty. 
Rather than basing its approval of the Sirius-XM merger on a voluntary 
price cap, the FCC should have permitted the merger without imposing 
conditions. Subsequently, the FCC should have conducted ex post 
assessments of the merger to determine whether it had any anticompetitive 
effect, and if such effects were found, then the FCC could have imposed 
structural or conduct remedies to reverse those effects. By following this 
regulatory path, the FCC would have assured itself of making the proper 
decision and, at the same time, it would have attenuated the uncertainty 
problem plaguing the market. 
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